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ABSTRACT

A group of 442 New York district jurisdictions (which are overwhelmingly rural but have some "metropolitan" county locations) with 2,500 or fewer pupils are subdivided by size (1,100 or fewer pupils, 210 rural or metropolitan sites; 1,100-2,500 pupils, 212 rural or metropolitan sites; and 20 small city or metropolitan sites of 2,500 or under pupils) and compared as a modified single system. The specific questions of the analysis were the following: (1) Do small K-12 districts, subdivided by size, differ systematically from one another according to select academic or fiscal variables? (2) Does the district size of 500 or fewer pupils or location in "metropolitan proximity" to New York's 5 biggest cities further erode the possibility of successfully implementing "local site" educational reform operations in select districts? (3) Which districts with fewer than 2,500 pupils are further identified as the "worst" academic districts according to six indices of schooling? (4) Which of these smaller (under 2,500 pupils) districts would be further classified as "true 1990s fiscal hardships" according to 6 economic indices? and (5) Which of these smaller districts (under 2,500 pupils) enjoy a special compensation to true redistribution of state aid resources under categories of "high tax" and "reorganization incentive" districts? Findings confirm patterns of systemic difference and specific particularity within the statewide system. Appended are five charts and a select glossary. (41 references) (MLF)

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The Plausibility of Implementing "Local Site" Educational Reform in New York's k-12 Districts With 2500 or Less Pupils

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The Plausibility of Implementing "Local Site" Educational Reform in New York's k-12 Districts With 2500 or Less Pupils

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Overview

On the surface, this is a policy study of the plausibility of implementing a particular educational reform agenda of mandated local "site based" operations within New York States' smallest(2500 or less pupils) k-12 school districts. In other words, a group of 442 existing New York district jurisdictions, subdivided by size and compared as a modified single "state" system in terms of the systemic variations within the existing organization, fit the plausibility of mandating decentralization to building level operations for curricular reform.

Although there are more than 700 k-12 districts in the state, and the five that are designated "big city" districts also contain four of every ten children attending public schools, the 442 districts to be studied are not insignificant. The numbers of school aged students affected by daily operations are more than one half a million, which is more than the number of New York school children in nonpublic k-12 situations throughout the state. The school population within the 442 districts of this study exceeds the 445,000 students in the entire state of Connecticut and can be bracketed between other neighboring states, such as Massachusetts 800,000 students and Vermont's 93,000 pupils.

At the deeper level, implementation of any curricular reform policy calling for major institutional reorganization(toward centralization or decentralization) in an era of severe fiscal uncertainty and shortage is not a policy question about curriculum processes or academic productivity. The curricular rationales that triggered the mandates for reforming the New York k-12 system statewide are not especially pertinent to actual implementation successes or failures as an organizational system in economic distress.

Here, the New York Board of Regents mandated a major educational reform containing an organizational premise of extreme decentralization called "local site" operations couched within a curricular argument for mandating such change. The true irony of the Regents' new Compact for Learning mandate to decentralize to "local site" operations rests upon the questionable success record in implementing the previous Regent Action Plan between 1984 and 1990. While there was much "top down" pressure to "ratchet" academic course scope and sequence, increased graduation requirements and many more resources put into enriching the professional "infrastructure" of the k-12 educational establishment, the four year long reform initiative did not persist (Fuhrman et al., 1988) as measured by greatly improved academic indices of productivity.

One would assume that rationalizing of a major new reform initiative would be based

upon organizational evidence as much as (or more) than curricular need assumptions. Despite those academic needs, organizational decentralization, especially mandates of extreme decentralization that challenge the traditional 'grassroots" legitimacy of local district jurisdictions, cannot be ordered or presented as a statelevel "inducement" argument for all k-12 districts (McDonnell and Elmore, 1989). Many of those educators "in the trenches" responsible for sustaining the mid 1980s Action Plan reform movement seem ambivalent about engaging the new Compact effort, especially the "shared decisionmaking" aspect of local site operations(Kearns, 1992).

Unfortunately, some districts most in need of honest Compact for Learning academic reforms are likely to be those districts least susceptible to "local site" reorganizing for economic reasons. The plausibility of "local site" implementation success in the 1990's seems to rest upon a situation-by-situation analysis of each district to be "impacted" upon, especially the relationship of institutional characteristics as general size of the k-12 pupil population and the fiscal context in which schooling operations expect to occur in the early 1990's.

As a research format, it was hypothesized that k-12 districts small enough to miss the automatic value in further subdivision to elementary and secondary building specializations(speculated as within the pool of k-12 districts under 2500) would be those districts most likely resist the "local site" mandates

It was further hypothesized that those small k-12 districts most preoccupied with the economic distress of emergency fiscal shortfalls and resource cuts in operating budgets would be those most unlikely to undertake major reorganization changes that emphasize the primacy of building level operations.

Purpose of Study

Using 2500 pupils in 1990 enrollment as the threshold of client size, all New York k-12 districts under that size were analyzed for their organizational plausibility of implementing the "local site" mandate of the Compact of Learning. The specific questions that drove the 442 district analysis were;

(1) do k-12 districts of ≤1100 and 1100-2500 pupil size or districts under 2500 with small city classification, differ systematically from one another according to select academic or fiscal variables? Do these cohort distinctions of "smallness" imply an organizational condition that should receive special attention in statelevel implementation strategies as they vary within the larger, statewide system of New York k-12 districts?

(2) does the k-12 district size distinction of ≤500 or location in "metropolitan proximity" to New York's five biggest cities further heighten the plausibility for not successfully implementing "local site" educational reform operations in select districts?

(3) which individual k-12 districts under 2500 are further identified as the "worst "

academic districts according to six indices of schooling assumed as a "curricular system"? These indices include grade six reading and math performance, secondary dropouts, annual teacher turnover, high school seniors indicating they were "college bound" and the proportion of Regent Degrees given to 1990 graduates.
(4) which individual k-12 districts under 2500 would be further classified as "true 1990s fiscal hardships" according to six economic indices? The indices included lowest dollars allocated per pupil(1988 per enrolled pupil and 1990 combined average daily membership), highest tax rates to highest percent of budget by state aid allocation in 1989, having the fiscal year 1990 budget decreased by the greatest percent in 1990, having the largest proportionate "shortfall" cuts to on-going operations in November 1990, had the voters turn down the 1991-92 operating budget the first time or were operating under a contingency or "barebones" budget for 1990-91 and 1991-92?
(5)Which individual k-12 districts under 2500 enjoy a special compensation to true redistribution of state aid resources under categories of "high tax" and "reorganization incentive" districts?

Local School Site Based Reform

Since the mid 1980's, the educational establishment in New York has tried mightily to reform itself. Under such reform labels as the Regents Action Plan, "Effective Schools" and Excellence and Accountability programs, k-12 initiatives are estimated to have cost the taxpayers 3.8 billion "add-on" dollars between 1985 and 1990.

The 1990's present a dramatic and fundamental reversal in the assumed meanings of conducting statewide educational reform. After a year of discussion, the Board of Regents (governing body of the entire New York educational system, including k-12) adopted a new reform initiative called Compact for Learning. The Compact based its assumptions of statewide change as occurring through extreme decentralization of curricular operations. Unlike the previous statewide reform efforts in the 1980's, the Compact mandated that primary operations for doing systemic reform were to be conducted at the local school site level, while district jurisdictions were to engage in secondary "goal setting" and general oversite.

While the rationale for such radical decentralization is readily apparent in those k-12 city jurisdictions that are perceived as too large and overly centralized to begin with(Public Education Association, 1987, Chalkin and Hamilton, July, 1988), it seems an unwarranted inference that the "local building site" would apply equally well to all k-12 district jurisdictions operating in the state. After all, more than 60 of these have less than 500 pupils in grades k-12 and are smaller than the size of a somewhat large elementary school.

Given the diversity of educational reform literature calling for preferred building level operations of 300 children in a particular elementary or 600 in secondary school(Goodlad, 1984), a minimum senior classes of 100 in a secondary school arrangement(U.S. Department of Education, 1988) or the suggestion that a secondary

school of 400 minimum can provide instructional services as well as secondary schools much larger(Monk, 1987), it seems that any statelevel reform initiative promoting decentralization to "local site" should consider the existing relationships of total district size and central office to local school building pattern on a case-by-case basis.

At a more sociological level of discussion, the question of ignoring small district size in "local site" mandates is somewhat akin to arguing desegregation needs for "minorities" in the large numbers of k-12 districts with 99% white student populations(which is a different question than all children appreciating the necessity of diversity in a multicultural society that specifies pluralism and democracy). Specifically, the policy question rests with the "urban" connotation for those "local site" situations with high concentrations of economically disadvantaged minority children (Edmunds, 1979) or a "city" connotation of special labor-management meanings. The 442 sites for detailed study are overwhelmingly rural, with 24 of the 210 ≤1100 districts(12%) 60 of the 212 districts of 1100 to 2500 size(28%) and three of the twenty small city districts under 2500 (15%) having a "metropolitan" county location(Ebert, 1984).

Lastly, the extreme decentralized nature of "local site" based operations within existing k-12 district jurisdictions may contravene long standing statelevel policy efforts to aggregate the jurisdictional meanings of k-12 governance by school district consolidation. Since the late 1950's, the New York Board of Regents and the rest of state government has generally promoted the desire to collapse little jurisdictions into larger ones so that , for public education, a final total of 500 k-12 districts could be realized (Galvrnick, 1991). While New York State enters the 1990's with a little more than 700 k-12 districts, the Governor has proposed that "reorganization incentive" monies double in FY 1992 to induce further mergers and consolidations of k-12 districts(State of the State, January 1992).

The Compact mandates of decentralized reform imply curricular reformers may be looking to local site operations when other public service policy makers are searching for increasing the economic "efficiencies" and "interagency cooperation" of regionalism/metropolitanism to compensate for an era of sustained fiscal shortages (Riley, 1990, Albany Times Union, February 9, 1992). This possibility of organizational mismatch raises the further implementation question of building level reform efforts that impede on going district level "service sharing" with municipal services, "interagency overlaps" with county, township in specialized policy areas and "recombining" of educational achievement meanings with other critical social and health needs for serving the "whole child."

Existing Organizational Arrangements in Small Districts Under 2500

A limitation of this plausibility study is the inability to document the internal organizational structures of 442 k-12 district organizations that would have to be actually modified by "local site" mandates. But, "rule of thumb" inferences about

plausibility of internal "impact" can be gained by a detailed profile of fifty k-12 districts under 2500 in the capital district of New York State (Capital Area School Development Association, December 1991).

This survey showed that those districts with less than 300 students in k-12 have from forty to sixty students in grades ten through twelve and about 25 in the senior class. Districts around 1100 have between 220 and 250 students in grades ten-twelve, a senior class of 70-85 students and, perhaps, a few ungraded secondary students or prekindergarten classes.

Districts between 2200 and 2500 have between 430 and 520 pupils in grades ten through twelve and senior classes from 160 to 190. These size districts, especially the small city district jurisdiction, also average between fifty and sixty students in ungraded secondary schooling.

Although all districts have chief school administrators and school business administrators, only those around 2500 have central office administrators for curriculum and guidance. No district within the 2500 cohort had a full time athletic director. Similarly, all districts of within the 2500 cohort hire supervisors for building and grounds, school lunch and transportation but no district hired a licensed practical nurse and only one district hired a health office assistant.

Districts around 1100 are likely to have a director or coordinator of special education, but the only other district level administrator for several supersmall jurisdictions was the "junior/senior" principal. At the building site level, there are few assistant senior high principals or middle/junior high principals in districts under 1100. Only one ≤500 district had an elementary principal. Districts under 1100 handle supervision and team leaders as stipends or compensatory time to salaries.

Total FTE certified staff for districts around 2500 range between 185 and 200 with ratios of staff per 1000 pupils in the high 70's to mid 80's (and dropping between 1990 and 1991). Districts close to 1100 pupils have approximately a hundred FTE certified staff and ratios per 1000 pupils in the high 80's. Districts under 500 have between 25 and 50 FTE staff and ratios per 1000 pupils well over 100. Sick leave for teachers in districts about 2500 and districts around 1100 average 15 days but districts around 500 size average closer to 12 days.

These data about existing organization within the k-12 district structure are the real "grassroots battleground" between statelevel curricular intent and fiscal realities of ongoing localized operation. Size of district may distinguish when elementary and secondary site distinctions are less effective in translating the "whole village teaches the child" intent and the fiscal constraints of situations where "shortfalls" can only be made up by the pragmatic of cutting into the full time teaching staff.

Methodological Prologue: Assumptions About Studying Implementation

Despite the systemic organizational variations in policy operations found in this study (or any other) due to pupil size, 1990's fiscal condition or previous reform

cooperation by districts, the actual implementing of future policy through the existing k-12 bureaucracy makes success estimates or improvement plausibility an a priori assertation at best.

As Elmore(1984) noted with his implementation study of special education, the only accurate description of actual organizational response to mandated legal requirements is achieved by "backward mapping" of adaptation over time. The actual translations of any aggregate intent to reform(international, national, state, regional or metropolitan) does not depend on the original logic behind a scheme for change (Murphy, 1976) or even the extent of "inducement" resources or politicized support initially available (Wildavsky and Pressman, 1976, Johnston and Geller, 1990).

Fortunately, "policy impact" methodologies that are available to the 1990's statelevel decisionmakers have also provided a middle ground between the futurist dream of complete certainties and the historian's nightmare of complete uncertainty. Systemic configurations of "local site" implementation plausibility can be described in terms of educational indicators about k-12 districts that imply the possibilities of altering on-going organizational processes and changing organizational outcomes or productivity (Monk, 1987, Fowler and Walberg, 1991, SED Bureau on District Reorganization...,1991). Further, contemporary economic analysts now feel comfortable with the internal logic of costing out the "effective" local school site(Windham, 1988) or assessing the "impact" of a specific science or math curriculum(Shavelson, et al., 1989).

One methodological consequence of using the "backward looking" approach to create plausible judgments or "hypothesis framing" about the future is the contravening of classic empiric assumptions about the design and conduct of good research(Tufte, 1974). The method implied in this study would have statelevel policymakers estimating the plausibility of implementation of educational reform initiatives with the following process:

" The 'first approximation' would be a listing of all variables known or believed to be or suspected to be of substantial significance and a corresponding listing of types and directions of interrelationships between these variables. A second stage of analysis would consist of combing out the probably least significant variables and interrelationships. Instead of beginning with rigor and elegance, only from this second stage on would these become legitimate goals, and even then for a time they should be distant goals....The final outcome of such a change in analytic procedure might well be a definite loss in rigor and elegance of design but a definite gain in scope for the useful exploitation of new information and insight."
(Emphasis added, Jacob Viner cited in Tufte, 1974, pp. 148-149)

Believed or Suspected to be of Substantial Significance

The Janus-like face of considering policy implementation plausibility creates a curricular face of those school districts found in greatest need of Compact educational reforms but also an organizational capacity face forth ability to initiate major "grassroots" operations or local site innovation given the present economic and political context. In this latter vein, each k-12 district is an organization of economic and political forces that can be identified as those facilitating the implementation of new "local site" operations as they balance against others that are likely to retard or stop implementation of any major change effort involving such reorganization (Wiles, 1974).

Cohorts of ≤500, ≤1100 , 1100-2500 and ≤2500 Small City Districts

The New York State's k-12 school districts creating the rationale for cohort comparison of ≤1100, 1100-2500 and city districts under 2500 groupings show contrasts to other profiles based upon size and contextual location.

Subdivisions	**Total in Study**	**Tapu* 1990**		
		min	**mean**	**max**
• ≤1100 in grades k-12	N=210	61	718	1273
•1100-2500 in grades k-12	N=212	1100	1612	2516
• small city dist ≤2500	N=20	1166	3337	3748
•≤500 in grades k-12	N=64	61	386	555
•1100-1500 in grades k-12	N=94	1100	1262	1489
•≤1100 in metro	N=24	61	811	1149
•1100-2500 in metro	N=60	1104	1714	2429
Other Cohort Possibilities				
•2500-4000 in grades k-12	N=85	2439	3078	3998
•4000-8000 in grades k-12	N=55	4012	5064	7206
•8000 + in grades k-12	N=18	8145	9905	17025
• all districts called "small city"	N=57	1097	4209	10046
• New York City	N=1		957,052	
•Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Yonkers	N=4	17309		44,403

* TAPU= a composite calculation of enrolled, including disabled and kindergarten

The extreme anomaly of the five big city districts to any statewide modeling effort of 700+ district jurisdictions(Wiles, 1990, 1991) and the predominantly rural focus of

the 2500 and below size districts in New York State were the primary reasons the five Big City districts were eliminated from "statewide" comparative study.

The Big 5 are fiscally dependent to their local municipal governments, have several state aid funding sources that are delimited only to these five jurisdictions(Vitrelli, 1983) and, most important, are the leading source of the official Board of Regent conclusion that New York education is operationally two systems, "one with children who are poor, of color and not achieving and the other rich, white and successful" (Commissioner Sobol, Prefaces in New York State of Learning, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991).

The districts under 2500 in the " big city " context were 84 districts of ≤1100 or 1100-2500 size and located in " metropolitan proximity" areas in the New York counties of Erie (Buffalo), Monroe (Rochester), Onondaga(Syracuse), Westchester(Yonkers and New York City), Nassau, Suffolk and Rockland(around New York City). In addition, the 20 "small city" districts under 2500 (but with all but Rye, Peekskill and Lackawana are not located in metropolitan proximity counties) were considered as a second possible meaning of "ruralized but special urban" influences.

Chart one baseline information here

Size based upon numbers of clients served opens up a wide set of other fiscal, academic and contextual policy questions. While the districts with more pupils served would be expected to be the ones to both generate and spend more monies to provide educational services, what would proportionate comparisons reveal about "capacity" of local wealth to provide resources, fiscal "effort" made to provide services, "equity" treatment of unequals or the "efficiency" in expenditure patterns for general governmental support, school administration, instruction or transportation (Swanson and King, 1991)? What are the comparative meanings of elementary academic achievement, secondary dropout or graduation rates? How emergency fiscal shortfalls absorbed and what can we imply about any district's economic propensity to engage in extremely decentralized reform?

Perhaps the most important lesson of considering the type of baseline data that provides maximum, mean and minimum values for comparison is the extent to which policy conclusions about group difference can be drawn. Baseline information provides a gross "rule of thumb" about existing patterns and is very valuable for "framing" hypotheses that can be systematically tested. On the other hand, statewide policy made on just the baseline information divided into subcohort expression can make serious overgeneralizations and miss the particular nuances that heighten the plausibility of success in implementing policies.

When the question of district size is assessed in New York State, it is quite apparent that "metropolitan proximity" in district location has a major and, perhaps, predominant impact on fiscal and academic characteristics. When the 84 "metro" districts are separated from the larger grouping of 422 districts under 2500 (excluding small city) we see that the total revenues available rise approximately $5000. As important for a shortfall era, the districts least dependent upon state aid monies are those under 2500 "metro"counties around big city districts, especially when compared to the total ≤1100 and 1100-2500 groups and the 4000-8000 size districts.

In "capacity" measures of combined wealth ratio(hereafter CWR) and the district wealth expressed as full valuation per pupil the "metro" districts under 2500 are very different, especially when compared to small city districts and 1100-1500 districts on CWR and small city and 8000+ districts on full valuation per pupil.

In "effort" the ≤1100 and 1100-2500 "metro" districts join the ≤500, ≤1100 and 1100-1500 cohorts as having the least tax rate (expressed in dollars per $1000 equalized valuation) while 8000+ districts have the highest tax rate of all groupings.

The highest percentages of nonpublic students are found in both the "metro proximity" 1100-2500 districts and the other "urban" jurisdictions called small city districts. While pupil sparcity is associated with the smallest pupil cohorts (≤500, ≤1100), the ≤1100 metro districts stand out as much less remote.

General governmental support and costs for educational administration seem to vary inversely for the ≤500 and ≤1100 cohorts. Districts over 8000 pupils spend least for general government support while large education administration costs are in small city, 2500-4000 and 4000-8000 cohorts.

The best Grade 6 Reading scores and least secondary school dropouts are found in the smallest districts (≤500) and the small metro districts ≤1100. The small city districts are the worst in each category. In an interesting turn, the worst output in terms of "college bound" expectations and percents of Regent Diplomas graduated are in the smallest size cohorts(≤500, ≤1100) and small city districts under 2500 while the best output performers are the 1100-2500 metro districts, the 4000-8000 and 8000+ districts.

The claim of a true "statewide k-12 system" (based upon lack of subgroup differences) seems most substantiated in instructional expenditures, transportation costs, grade six mathematics scores and the distribution of November 1990 deficit costs.

The political drama leading up to resolution of the FY 1990 budget shows the shifting nature of the "negotiated" reality between November 1989 and May 1990. The proposals by the Board of Regents and the Governor showed the relative weighting of k-12 districts by the educational establishment advocate and by the larger concern for the entire public service sector exhibited by the Executive.

The Regents slated the greatest increases for small city districts, the smallest (≤500 and ≤1100) districts and the largest (8000+) districts. The Governor's proposal made two months later(January 1990) delimited the small city group to those under 2500, but retained the smallest districts (≤500 and 1100-1500) for the largest increases.

The final budget resolution made in May 1990 found the smallest cohorts (>500, ≤1100), the metropolitan proximity districts and all small city districts garnered the largest increases, while the worst off were all districts over 4000 pupils.

To end, the baseline "rule of thumb" interpretation would be for statelevel policy makers to look carefully at certain variables when the ≤1100 and 1100-2500 subgroups are subjected to the impact of "metropolitan" location and such fiscal "capacity" indices as combined wealth ratio, full valuation dollars per pupil and such fiscal "effort" variables as dollars expended per pupil. Similarly, the "metro" impact seems to effect grade six reading, seniors indicating "college bound", percent of Regent Diplomas given and even the percent of increases received in the FY 1990 budget.

Question 1 and 2) Combing Out the Probably Least Significant

While "rule of thumb" discussion sets the stage, the "combing out" suggested by Viner(in Tufte, 1974) as the next step in cohort analysis, is to distinguish "probably least significant" from the "substantive significant" sources of systematic variability when talking about the internal composition of districts of ≤1100 size, of 1100-2500 district size or≤2500 small city districts. As the statewide policy implementation of the Compact of Learning specifies a uniform mandate or, at least, implies common implementation efforts to promote educational reform operations, the core "impact" question for intra group comparisons was the extent to which individual district jurisdictions vary systematically from one another on key sets of variables.

There has been much work done trying to find the relationship between optimum jurisdiction size when determined by estimates of client utilization rate and costs to operate, but few economies of scale efforts have also assessed the effects of varying size upon educational achievement outcomes(eg. Riew, 1981, Fox, 1981).

One study by the New York State Education Department(Bureau of District Reorganization, Summer 1991) specifically compared several curricular, organizational and fiscal variables to imply differences about k-12 schooling operations when ≤500 districts were assessed against those of 1200-1500 size. Although the SED study rationalized on "local choices" of particular districts (eg. to consolidate for fiscal reasons by the ≤500 group or to have the enriched curricular character of 100 graduating seniors in the 1200-1500 group), the methodological format was exclusively mean averages to discuss "difference" and, most curiously, with the highest and lowest three districts in each grouping deliberately removed so "the really atypical numbers that might distort the results of the majority are eliminated"(ibid, page 3).

The SED interpretation of difference between the two groups identified by major

fiscal variables (average teacher salary and total expenditures per pupil) also engaged in some interesting "what if" comparisons, using pupil/teacher ratios to build comparative "cost saving" arguments if the 1200-1500 ratio were used to calculate the ≤500 group of districts by their students.

Obviously, statelevel policymakers need to be familiar with baseline information capable of establishing an array of possible variables to study, have such information presented so that central tendency and extent of variations are showed for all groupings and, important, know the qualitative limits of description into speculations. Furtner, if individual districts are later to be identified as a second iteration of bridging between cohort and jurisdiction responsible for a reform agenda, then extreme cases or "outliers" should not be removed to give a majority impression.

Another methodological effort somewhat analogous to the cohort comparison approach used here was a study of New Jersey schools (Fowler and Walberg, l99l) that attempted to create a composite picture of local site data (eg. pupil characteristics, high school proficiency scores) and district level information(eg. average teacher salary)to study the systematic relationships between organizational size and educational outcomes. Using stepwise regression to work "backward", the authors determined that district socioeconomic characteristics(l980 Census tract information reanalyzed to school districts), followed by percent of low income students in a school, then by size of a school site(as enrolled pupils) and finally, number of schools in a district were the four variables most "consistently" associated with standard test performances(l99l, pages 197-l99).

A. General Approach

Holding total revenues(for l988-89) constant as the dependent variable illustrating "the available resource pool, it is possible to identify special characteristics of internal variability among fiscal features of k-12 districts that could effect organizational strategies of implementing "local site" reform statewide. Returning to the descriptive indices(above)we now search for possible independent variables that might exhibit a statistically significant (.05) relationship within each subgrouping by using multiple, stepwise regression.

Similarly, holding "collegebound" expectations of graduating seniors constant as a "productivity" indice related to the graduating pupil client, it is also possible to identify some academic features that could characterize organizational processes important in assessing the plausibility of curricular reform interventions. While the perceptions of seniors about "collegebound" expectations are likely to be inflated when compared to the reality of attending postsecondary institutions, and are methodologically questionable as "hard" enough data about actual client productivity, they provide a logical basis to search for systematic variation in the academic domain. Again, we use select baseline data indices and multiple regression to search for statistical significance(.05).

The reader should note that ethnicity, race and socioeconomic indices about the student were deliberately not entered into either the set of organizational strategies or processes variables. To document that poor achievement is related statistically to poor and/or nonwhite children(Sobol Preface, New York State of Learning, January 1989, 1990, 1991)seems nonproductive and "blaming the victim" when considering the organizational plausibility of implementing local site operations as a proactive implication of Compact reform.

Stepwise regression of the ≤1100, 1100-2500 and 2500 small city cohorts identified a "first cut" of those variables with statistically significant relationships(.05) to either total district revenues or collegebound perception dependent variables. Regression consideration of the found variables presented the actual configurations of differences among the cohort subgroupings in both statistical data and scattergram formats.

Chart 2 on regression results here

B. Cohort Identity As General Revenues, 1988-89

The search for systematic relationships to a district's total revenues(1989)included the possible independent variables of property tax as percent of revenue, state aid as precent of revenue, state aid as dollars(1989), dollars per enrolled pupil(Fall 1988), combined wealth ratio, tax rate in dollars per $1000 full valuation, district as equalized valuation dollars per pupil, percent of non public students in district, remoteness as ratio of pupils to square miles and percent of total revenues devoted to expenditures for general government support, educational administration, instruction and transportation [see glossary for technical definitions]

The ≤1100 subgroup (n=207 with three missing cases) had five descriptor variables exhibit statistically significant variation; percent of general support and educational administration expenditures to total revenues, the dollars per enrolled pupil, state aid as percent of total revenues and as actual dollars. The five descriptors combined to explain .78 of the systemic variance (Correlation squared)with an F Test value of 145.5 while the beta weight probabilities of each descriptor variable(to t-values of normalcy) ranged from .017 to .0001.

Because the New York State Education Department seems particularly interested in the smallest ≤500 districts, a subanalysis was made of this group(n=64 with no missing cases. The pattern of the ≤1100 cohort was reconfirmed although the correlation squared slipped to .70, the F Test to 34.6 and the beta weight probabilities(for the same descriptor variables as the ≤1100 cohort) to a range of .051 to .0001.

The 1100-2500 cohort(n=208 with four missing cases) analysis of total revenues identified four statistically significant descriptor variables; property tax as percent of total variables, the combined wealth ratio, the dollars per enrolled pupil and state aid in

dollars. Because the greatest internal variability in the 1100-2500 cohort is in "district capacity" as opposed to the ≤1100 district expenditures there is no automatic fiscal commonality among New York's small districts to be assumed in statelevel planning or mandating.

The four descriptors for the 1100-2500 cohort combined to account for .91(correlation squared) variation with an F Test value of 493.9 and all beta weights were significant at .0001 probability.

The twenty small district cohort exhibit yet another pattern of internal variability, with total revenues significantly associated with combined wealth ratio("fudged" to .06 for these discussion purposes), state aid as percent of total revenue and state aid as dollars. These indices accounted for .97 of systemic variation(correlation squared)and an F Test value of 194.4. Beta weight probabilities ranged from .0622 to .000l.

C. Cohort Identity as "College Bound" Perceptions of Graduating Seniors

The same process of identifying systematic internal variability of each cohort was applied with "college bound" perceptions as the dependent variable. In this study, the possible descriptor variables included grade six reading and math scores, secondary school dropout, teacher turnover and percent of Regent diplomas given.

The ≤1100 cohort identified three statistically significant indices with the "college bound" variable. grade six reading, secondary dropout and percent of Regent Diplomas given. The necessity of analyzing academic variables separately from the dominating fiscal variables was born out as the correlation squared accounted for a meager .08 and the F Test value was 6.06(significant at .0006)The beta weight probability ranges from .037 to .011.

The ≤500 subgroup analysis(n=63 with one case missing) revealed only the percent of Regent diplomas to be statistically related to "college bound" perceptions at the .05 or less level of significance. The correlation squared value was .09 and the F Test value 5.74(significant at .019).

The 1100-2500 cohort duplicated the ≤1100 cohort results with the same three indices being statistically significant. In the case of this cohort, yet, the correlation squared indication of systemic variation accounted for was more substantial (.33) as was the F Test (33.27) and beta weight probabilities (from .015 to .0001). Further, where grade six reading accounted for the most variability in the ≤1100 college "boundness," the 1100-2500 grouping significantly associated college bound with dropouts.

Finally, the twenty small city districts under 2500 statistically related college bound with secondary dropouts. This systemic relationship accounted for .18 correlation squared, an F Test of 3.85 and beta weight value of .0655 probability(again, slight "fudge" for policy descriptions).

In terms of "combing" information gained that would be especially helpful to statelevel policy makers concerned with actual Compact implementation, these data suggest a detailed look at both ≤500 and 1100 districts for the inverse relationship of general government and educational administration patterns of expenditures and the actual distribution of secondary dropouts for districts above the 500 threshold but below the 1100 boundary. Because of the strong indication of "metropolitan" location in baseline and the statistically significant fiscal variables, this feature would be identified.

Actual ranking ordering of individual districts with high secondary dropouts(6.2 to 12.2%) reveals that this is a policy issue for rural districts above 500 students. The aggregate reason statistical significance registered for the ≤1100 subgroup seems explained by the twenty six districts reporting zero secondary dropouts(0%), twelve below 500 population. Only two of the below 500 districts are in "metropolitan proximity" while eight of the fourteen districts with 500-1100 student population are "urban." While some zero reports are likely lack of data, the underlying patterns within the ≤1100 cohort seem distinguishable.

Because the issue of implementation plausibility seems so related to the investment in existing institutional arrangements of the smaller districts, the actual ≤1100 districts with the largest and smallest percents of their revenues in general support, administration or a combination of both are illustrated below.

≤1100 Districts as Admin. /General Support Expenditures

Least Expenditures as Percent of Revenue

combined percents	general support	education admin
(.001)	(2.1 to 4.7%)	(.04 to .4%)
•Prattsburg/Steuben	•Edward Knox/St. Lawrence	•Prattsburg/Steuben
•Edward Knox/St. Lawrence	•Salem/Washington	Westport/Essex
Westport/Essex	•Geneseo/Livingston	Newcomb/Essex
Wells/Hamilton	•Hadley-Luzurne/Warren	Wells/Hamilton
•Hinsdale/Cattaragus	•Brocton/Chautauqua	Fisher Is/Suffolk
Richburg/Allegheny	•Ticonderoga/Essex	Hammond/St. Lawrence
Newcomb/Essex	•Ft. Edwards/Washington	Narrowsburg/Sullivan
Hammond/St. Lawrence	•Middleburgh/Schoharie	Elizabethtown/Essex
Jefferson/Schoharie	•Waterford-Halfmoon/Saratoga	Keene/Essex
Brookfield/Madison	•Pavilion/Genesse	Richburg/Allegheny
•LaFargeville/Jefferson		
Elizabethtown/Essex		

Most Expenditures as Percent of Revenue

Combined percents (7-11%)	General Support (10.4-14.5%)	Administration (8.1-11.4%)
•Alfred-Almond/Allegheny	Keene/Essex	•Chester/Orange
Green Island/Albany	Elizabethtown/Essex	•Jasper-Troup/Steuben
•Clymer/Chautauqua	Indian Lake/Hamilton	•Schodack/Rensselaer
•Bronxville/Westchester	Canaserga/Allegheny	•Elmsford/Westchester
•Afton/Chenango	Cohocton/Steuben	•Hunter-Tanner/Greene
•Hunter-Tanner/Greene	S. Kortright/Delaware	•Clymer/Chautauqua
•Jasper-Troup/Steuben	Andes/Delaware	•Alfred-Almond/Allegheny
•Blind Brook/Westchester	•Elmsford/Westchester	•Bronxville/Westchester
•Elmsford/Westchester	Long Lake/Hamilton	•North Salem/Westchester
	Fisher Is./Suffolk	•Blind Brook/Westchester

•=0ver 500 pupils

We can see that the +500 districts have the largest combined expenditures, the smallest expenditures for general support and the largest for education administration. Only Elmsford of Westchester County is among the biggest spending in all three categories. Conversely, districts under 500 make the largest expenditures toward general government support and least in education administration.

Question 3 ,4, & 5) Educational and Economic Shifts in K-12 Districts

Hopefully the methodological analogy of peeling back leaves of an artichoke has been established as the exploitation of "implementation plausibility" continues. Establishing an organizational argument that implementation of statewide mandates should consider the "k-12 system" as distinct cohorts, also sets the next, deeper "peel" of identifying individual k-12 districts most in need of schooling reform and those in most dire economic straits.

A. Needing Educational Reform

The schematic below shows a composite measure of six indices that allow statelevel policymakers to make aggregate, "first cut" conclusions about which k-12 districts are challenging a "social minimum" in terms of need for immediate educational reform interventions. While the actual credibility of this type of calculation rests upon its ability to factor in other social and contextual "process" indices, establish longitudinal verifications of crossectional conclusions and refine the measurement meanings of each indice under scrutiny, the scheme does provide a logic for identifying individual districts.

K-12 School District in Operation as Educating System

Grade 6 Reading SRP **Student Dropouts** **Seniors "collegebound"**

Graduates with Regent Diplomas

Grade 6 Math SRP **Teacher Turnovers**

To illustrate the translation of cohort foci to individual district analysis it was decided to identify a special cluster of thirty five "most in need" k-12 districts by the following formula: (a)list the worst 20 districts on each indice for ≤1100 and 1100-2500 cohort subgroups and 10 worst districts from the ≤2500 small city district cohort; (b) select the 15 districts for both the ≤1100 and 1100-2500 subgrouping and the four small city districts with the "worst" composite scores when all six indices are combined.

Chart 3 here

While there are obvious reasons why the six indices should not be weighed equally in educational "impact" or need of immediate reform, the idea that any k-12 district would rank in the bottom 20 of a cohort of 200+ districts of similar size on two or more educational indices creates a strong proxy argument.

Most in Need of Educational Reforms By Composite Scores

≤1100	1100-2500	Small City Under 2500
Rushford/Allegheny	Harpursville/Broome	Dunkirk/Chautauqua
Limestone/Cattaragus	Port Bryam/Cayuga	Elmira/Chemung
Ostelic Valley/Chenango	Bainbridge/Chenango	Hudson/Columbia
S. New Berlin/Chenango	Copake-Taconic/Columbia	Johnstown/Fulton
Andes/Delaware	Dover/Dutchess	
Downsville/Delaware	Cairo-Durham/Greene	
Westport/Essex	Hannibal/Oswego	
Brushton-Mor/Franklin	Altmar Parish/Oswego	
Oppenheim-Emphrah/Fulton	Berlin/Rensselaer	
Lyme/Jefferson	Cornith/Saratoga	
Florida/Orange	Waterloo/Seneca	
Worchester/Ostego	Wyandach/Suffolk	
Remsen/Oneida	Roundout/Ulster	
Livingston Manor/Sullivan	Ellenville/Ulster	
Cohocton/Steuben	N. Rose-Wolcott/Wayne	

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B. In Dire Economic Straits

As argued from the outset, implementation of educational reform mandates will rest at least as much on the contextual realities of New York State in the early 1990's as any demonstration of schooling failures.

K-12 School District as System of Economic Distress

lowest dollars per CAADM pupil, 1990	**decrease in FY 90 Budget to Total Revenues**	**on Contingency Budget 1990-91, 1991-92**
high/low tax rates on with high % state aid	**large deficit cuts Nov. 90 to Total Revenues**	**Not pass 91-92 budget on 1st effort**

But, even k-12 districts that exhibit conditions of economic distress can have compensating features for those concerned with implementing educational reform. Two such features in New York State are whether a district is receiving a special "High Tax" compensation and/or "Reorganization Incentive" monies besides their regular allocations. High Tax and Reorganization Incentive Aid are legislative recognition of special fiscal disparities and distributions that need political based compensations. These special compensations coexist with New York State's elaborate attempt to use formula financing to promote equalization and equity values. They have grown up over the years as political fixtures in statelevel allocations that such compensation only apply to select districts on the grounds of wealth or legal definition.

Such politicized definitions continue to be "sacred cows" because, in part, they are perceived as a "fair" trade for parallel special compensations to the fiscally dependent Big 5 City districts. While it could be argued that either compensation might further detract from a "local site" sentiment within a district jurisdiction, the indicators add potentials for statelevel "inducement" pressures to try new organization arrangements (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987).

Districts in Economic Distress as 1990's Begin

≤1100

District/County	Reasons for Distress	Compensations
Green Island/Albany	contingency budget	high tax
Alfred-Almond/Allegheny	contingency budget	
Richburg/Allegheny•	tax rate/%state aid	
Scio/Allegheny	tax rate/%state aid	
Friendship/Allegheny	tax rate/% state aid	
Whitesville/Allegheny	tax rate/%state aid	
West Valley/Allegheny	contingency budget	

Limestone/Cattaragus	tax rate/%state aid	
Hinsdale/Cattaragus•	lowest per pupil	
Pine Valley/Chautauqua	contingency budget	
Pawling/Dutchess•	FY 90 Budget -12.2%	
Schroon Lake/Essex	FY 90 Budget -3.7%, contingency budget	
Elizabethtown/Essex	contingency budget	
Oppenheim-Emp/Fulton	FY 90 Budget -4.0%	
West Canada Valley/Herkimer	contingency budget, tax rate/%state aid	
Bellville/Jefferson•	tax rate/state aid %	
Avon/Livingston	FY 90 Budget -5.6%	
Brookfield/Madison	tax rate/%state aid	
Hamilton/Madison	FY 90 Budget -5.6%	
Florida/Orange	contingency budget	90 budget +37%
Edmeston/Ostego	lowest per pupil	
Cooperstown/Ostego	lowest per pupil	
Romulus/Seneca	FY 90 Budget -7.8% tax rate/% state aid	
Savona/Steuben	tax rate/state aid %	high tax
Bradford/Steuben	contingency budget, tax rate/%state aid	
Campbell/Steuben	FY 90 Budget -10.2%	high tax
Greenwood/Steuben	tax rate% state aid	
Jasper-Troup/Steuben•	tax rate/% state aid	
Candor/Tioga•	lowest per pupil	

1100-2500

District/County	Reasons for Distress	Compensations
Wellsville/Allegheny	lowest per pupil, budget not pass 1st time	
Whitney Point/Broome•	lowest per pupil	
Chenango Forks/Broome	tax rate/%state aid	high tax
Allegheny/Cattaragus	lowest per pupil	
Portville/Cattaragus	lowest per pupil	
Falconer/Chautauqua•	FY 90 Budget	
Cassadaga Val/ Chautauqua	contingency budget	
Port Bryam/Cayuga	contingency budget	
Sherburne-Earl/Chenango	tax rate/%state aid	high tax
Bainbridge/Chenango	tax rate/%state aid	
Northeastern/Clinton	conting. budget, tax rate	high tax 90Bud+24.1
Beekmanville/Clinton	contingency budget	
Holland/Erie	tax rate/state aid%	
Mayfield/Fulton	contingency budget	

Coxsackie/Greene	not pass budget 1st time	
Dolgeville/Herkimer	FY 90 Budget, tax rate/	Reorganization $
Ilion/Herkimer	lowest per pupil, tax rate/%state aid	
Mohawk/Herkimer	tax rate/% state aid	
Thousand Is/Jefferson	FY 90 Budget -3.7	Reorganization $
S. Jefferson/Jefferson	FY 90 Budget -4.3	
Indian River/Jefferson	lowest per pupil	
Lowville/Lewis	lowest per pupil	
Canastoga/Madison	contingency budget	
Canajoharie/Montgomery	contingency budget	Reorganization $
Adirondack/Oneida	lowest per pupil	
Holland/Oneida	tax rate/%state aid	
Gorham-M/Ontario	FY 90 budget -6.6	
Hannibal/Oswego	tax rate/%state aid	
Sandy Creek/Ostego•	tax rate/%state aid	
Brunswick/Rensselaer•	tax rate/state aid%	high tax
Lansingburgh/Rensselaer	tax rate/ state aid %	high tax
Canton/St. Lawrence	tax rate/%state aid	
Norwood/St. Lawrence	contingency budget	
Bath/Steuben•	lowest per pupil	
Wayland/Steuben	contingency budget	
Fallsburgh/Sullivan	contingency budget	90 Budget +24%
Bayport-Blue/Suffolk	contingency budget	high tax,
Wyandach/Suffolk•	tax rate/% state aid	high tax
Waverly/Tioga	tax rate/% state aid	
Granville/Washington•	tax rate/% state aid	
Clyde-Savannah/Wayne	contin budget, FY 90 Budget -5.6	Reorganization $
Sodus/Wayne	contingency budget	
Greenburgh/Westchester•	FY 90 Budget -4.9	Reorganization $,
Ardsley/Westchester	FY 90 Budget -2.3	
Mt. Sinai/Westchester	tax rate/state aid %	high tax,Bud +22.7
Attica/Wyoming	contingency budget	

Small City Under 2500

district/county	**reasons for distress**	**compensations**
Cohoes/Albany	tax rate/%state aid	
Dunkirk/Chautauqua	not pass 1st time	
Norwich/Chenango	90 Budget, not 1st time, tax rate	high tax
Lackawana/Erie	tax rate/% state, not 1st time	high tax
Johnstown/Fulton	FY 90 Budget, not 1st time	Reorganizat $, high tax
Little Falls/Herkimer	lowest per pupil,not pass 1st	FY 90 budget

Oneonta/Ostego	FY 90 budget, not pass 1st time	
Canandaguia/Ontario	lowest per pupil	
Geneva/Ontario	lowest per pupil, not pass 1st time	
Rensselaer/Rensselaer	tax rate/% state aid	high tax
Mechanicville/Saratoga	not pass 1st time	FY 90 Bud, high tax
Hornell/Steuben	tax rate/%state aid	high tax
Ogdenburg/St.Lawrence	90 budget-17.1%, not 1st time	high tax
Peekskill/Westchester	tax rate/%state aid	high tax

•= not participate in SED Survey of cuts, so actual condition could be even worse than reported here.

Two general conclusions seem to leap from the economic distress information about New York k-12 districts under 2500. First, 13%(29)of the ≤1100 ,21%(46)of the 1100-2500 groups of districts and 70% of the small city districts under 2500 could build some form of argument for economic distress based upon one or more of the indices used here. Some districts imply a condition so severe that compensations are inadequate. For example, Florida of Orange County(>1100)and Northeastern of Clinton County and Fallsburgh of Sullivan County(1100-2500) received large increases in the FY l990 Budget but still are on contingency budgets in the l99l-92 academic year. Further, the largest questions of fiscal problems rest mostly with those districts whose pupil size may make them the most logical candidates to engage readily in "local site" reforms. In short, if economic distress proves to be a disincentive to engaging in new Compact reform efforts, the state should expect a staggered reaction to the "local site" mandate from districts under 2500 on fiscal grounds alone.

Second, there is almost no overlap between the meaning of k-12 district as a schooling system most in need of educational reforms and the meaning of district as a system of extreme economic distress. Only eight districts (three in ≤1100, three in 1100-2500 and two in small city) are identified as "extreme" by both educational and economic indices. In other words, the districts most likely to claim economic distress despite a strong argument for immediate need of educational reforms are Limestone of Cattaragus, Dunkirk in Chautauqua County, Bainbridge of Chenango County, Oppenheim-Emprath and Johnstown of Fulton County, Florida in Orange County, Hannibal in Oswego County and Wyandach in Suffolk County.

Exploitation of New Information and Insights

The acid test of the Viner approach to systemic analysis rests with the actual exploitation of new information to improve policy assumptions and a priori assertions about statewide implementation. Four insights about the plausibility of implementing the "local site" mandate help educators and other public service policy makers concerned

with the upcoming success of the Compact for Learning initiative.

First, the key findings from this study of New York k-12 districts under 2500 pupil size confirm patterns of systemic difference and specific particularity within the statewide system, both as ≤1100 or 1100-2500 size groupings and as specific relationships between a ≤1100 district's revenue "pool" and expenditures for General Support and Educational Administration.

The study would conclude that statelevel mandates for "local site" implementation must allow for "variances" for particular districts and subgrouping or expect actual implementing will vary according to existing investments in district governance. Still, it is possible that the plausibility of "tailoring" mandates to particular districts on grounds of overriding economic conditions will be ignored or treated as creating a direct challenge to the existing curricular image of statelevel authority.

We could anticipate two types of curricular argument to justify undifferentiated implementation of "local site" operations. One rationale would declare that very small district and building level management are, by definition of scale alone, the same organizational phenomenon(Swanson and King, page 191, Swanson and Jacobson, 1989, page 42). The reduced scale argument is, in effect, that small districts decide administration and teacher union matters about curriculum and instruction at the school site level naturally (Cooper, 1990). For example, Jacobson and Woodworth (April, 1991) argue that the existing structure and organizational realities of small(≤1100) and rural districts "produce remarkable similarities between the vision and operation of site based management"(ibid. page 17).

Another alternative is declaring that centralization and decentralization are the same curricular oriented phenomenon when discussing small district organization and to emphasize that successful implementation is more dependent upon "transaction costs" than systematic variations in fiscal or academic characteristics(Swanson, 1991). In this vein, both economics of scale and systematic consideration of district size are not deemed especially valuable in anticipating implementation success because the actual transaction costs are "communication, coordination and deciding"(Williamson, 1975). The transaction argument may rationalize the reliance upon the "vision" of site based principals(Blumberg and Greenfield, 1983), the need for local schools with "character"(Hill, et al., 1991) or the "empowerment" that shared decision making entails.

A second finding of major importance in estimating implementation success from fiscal data are the overlays of traditional measures of "capacity" , such as tax rate based upon dollars per $1000 full valuation, and the special character of making up statelevel shortfalls under emergency conditions. The emergency specifies that needed revenues must come from statelevel sources that are readily accessed.

Prior to the present era of continuing threats by mid year "shortfalls," basic questions of fiscal equity and possibilities of fundamental resource redistribution

between k-12 districts rested with total revenues available to operate. Now New York State seems to have an endemic problem of accurately estimating the revenues needed for a entire twelve months. k-12 districts with large proportions of their revenues from "formula driven" aid seem especially sensitive to cross-the-board percent cuts of state aid to make up emergency shortfalls. A ranking of k-12 districts in each cohort through the combination of existing tax rate (actual dollars per $1000 full valuation)and percent of revenues gained through state aid reveals three district conditions; worst off and most susceptible to deficit cuts, best off and most immune to deficit and "anomalies."

Chart 4 here

Clearly, the generally "worst off" ≤1100 districts under these specifications have a tax rate of approximately 11.00 to 13.00 dollars per $1000 full valuation and between 65 and 90 percent of revenues coming from statelevel allocations. "Worst" districts between 1100-2500 have the same state aid proportions but a tax rate of two or three dollars more.

More important to those interested in the future of Compact for Learning reforms for all districts statewide, it seems clear from the study of "anomaly clusters" that some districts with high wealth capacity may have used the half decade of enriched Regent Action Plan resources to lower property taxes in their jurisdictions. Districts under 1100 such as Shelter Island, Bridgehampton and Fisher Island of Suffolk county, Bolton of Warren County, Barker of Niagara County and Schroon Lake of Essex County probably began the "at risk" era of the l980's with superior curricular programs so that new state standards to "rachet down" were perceived as always beneath the then present performance level. Now facing the dramatic shortfall era, these same small districts have a community who thinks that "curricular reform" monies could legitimately compensate against paying higher property taxes. Couple this expectation with because state aid only contributes between 8 and 21% of the entire revenue base and the relative immunity to state emergency redistribution policies becomes evident.

Consider a second cluster of "anomaly" districts with comparatively low tax rates but where 60 and 83% of their revenues are dependent on state aid allocations. The policy impact of tax rate for districts like West Canada Valley and Dolgeville of Herkimer County, Gowanda and the small city district of Salamanca in Cattaragus, Hannibal in Oswego County, Bellville in Jefferson, the small city district of Hornell in Steuben County and, finally, the district of Romulus in Seneca, create a different kind of "anomalous" policy meaning for districts having poor "capacity" and being dependent upon statelevel fiscal impacts.

Third, the exploitation of new information about districts under 2500 and their adaptative response through contingency budgeting in 1990-92 may help force consideration of the "available technology" arguments about meanings of district and local site jurisdictions in operation(Swanson, 1991, Windham, 1992).

The core question centers upon statewide survey information that is complete enough to be judged valid and reliable. Since the shortfall era began in 1990, it seems that the New York State Education Department has very limited success in receiving soliciting information about the rapidly changing "grassroots" situation. For example, in attempting to gather information about the need to alleviate certain mandates and regulations in Fall 1990, the Department sent a questionnaire to 5,700 possible respondents. Six months later only 190 questionnaires, or a remarkably low 3% of the possible response, had been returned. The outsider must conclude either that the "grassroots" of New York educators are disinterested in the particular topic of mandates or that the State Education Department lost its capability to induce compliance to data collection.

The "contingency budget" information used in this study to describe districts in economic distress was taken from a State Education Department statewide survey conducted between September and November 1991 about the "impact of fiscal cuts upon the actual operations of the k-12 districts"(Walton memo "Survey of Effects of State Aid Deficit Reductions," September 1991).

The special set of k-12 districts identified with "contingency budgets" seems to allow statelevel policymakers to consider specifically the hypotheses of many "size" studies that the variety of programs identified by separate programs truly measures the diversity of opportunity for learning. According to proponents of "classroom technology" analysis this assertion could be very wrong, especially for districts under 2500.

In a one room schoolhouse, the diversity of on going programs may be reflected in the diversity of the children(eg. Several grades combined) and the flexibility of the teacher. In the modern but very small district the same human diversity is supplemented by the computer driven instructional technology and electronic communication networks that could provide extended opportunities for enrichment and individualization. The assumed richness of the curriculum of a large, comprehensive high school with larger numbers of program offerings could turn out to be unsubstantiated, if patterns of teacher specialization and bureaucratic rigidity create a fragmented "shopping mall" type environment. If a large but topsy-turvy collection of courses compare to a smaller but tightly knit curriculum, the qualitative edge goes to cohesiveness and coherence.

Chart 5 here

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The danger for New York policy makers is that the very survey information that apparently leads toward the identity of early 1990's "contingency" situations- and the possible documentation of coherence or cohesiveness arguments- lacks general methodological credibility. A full 30 percent of both the ≤1100 and 1100-2500 cohorts refused to participate in the State Education Department survey, perhaps giving an even stronger message for future efforts to assess actual adaptation to Compact for Learning mandates.

Finally, this study suggests new insights into the traditional distinctions of urban and rural districts. While the actual findings of this effort centered upon k-12 districts in "metropolitan proximity' to big city school districts and the special classification of "small city" school districts, there is another layering of insightful suggestion found at the other end of the spectrum. Future study should focus upon the special rural qualities of ≤1100 districts located in the seven New York counties classified as "most limited" in urban influence(Ebert, 1984). According to 1980 Census information "most limited" meant the size of the largest place in the county was less than 10,000 and less than 20% of the workforce commuted outside the county of residence for employment.

Small K-12 districts within Allegheny, Chenango, Delaware, Essex, Franklin, Lewis and Sullivan counties seem, on face value, to exhibit special contextual features that could effect successful implementation for "rural" reasons . .. Five of the ten ≤1100 districts identified with the highest percent investment in general government supports and six of the ten ≤1100 districts with the lowest percent investment in administration expenditures are located in the seven "most limited" counties. These data suggest special connotations for both "local site" managing and "interagency cooperation" with other public services in the immediate community.

Second, over a fourth(8/29 or 27%) of the ≤1100 districts identified as exhibiting signs of real economic distress were located within the "most limited urban" counties of New York. More specifically, all the >1100 districts were located in either Alleghany or Essex counties.

Third, over one half (8/15 or 53%) of ≤1100 districts in most need of improving educational performance are located in the "most limited" counties. There seems little need to debate whether fundamental changes are needed to help the existing curriculum situation in most rural New York State. What does seem to need a policy reconsideration is the assumption that the plausibility of implementation success rests with a curricular judgment of need.

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Select Glossary

Administration Expenditures: According to the Comptroller, Administration is a subset of the Instruction function and includes expenditures for curriculum development and supervision of regular and special schools, research, planning and evaluation, in-service training, school library, audiovisual, television and computer assisted instruction. **Note** that the State Education Department includes salaries for pupil personnel, curriculum development and instruction and BOCES under "Instruction".

Approved Operating Expenditures (used in formular driven state aid calculations). Operating expenses for day-day operation of district. Not included are expenses for building construction, transportation, some expenditures to purchase services from a BOCES, tuition payments to other districts. When approved operating expenditures were divided by aidable pupils, plus additional weightings for pupils with handicapping conditions, for 1991-92 the state average expense was $5,650. The state maximum expense as (AOP/TAPU)is $6,350.

Average Daily Attendance: average number of pupils present on each regular school day in a given period, determined by dividing the aggregate attendance days of all pupils by the number of days school was in session. Contrast ADA with Enrolled Pupils as the total number of students on the school rolls when the BEDS(Basic Educational Data System)information is collected for the current year.

Combined Wealth Ratio: measure of district wealth which takes into account the full value of a district's taxable property and the adjusted gross income of residents in the district as reported on their state income tax forms. A district with the state's average wealth per pupil with have a CWR= 1.00

Deficit Cuts: In November 1990, the state legislature determined an emergency deficit reduction to the state aid portion of district operating expenses. The $280 million "shortfall" was calculated on $75.11 with a "cap" of 8.5% of approved operating expenses. In July 1991 there was an "additonal specified deficit reduction" based upon a computer listing filed in support of the supplemental budget of July 1991. For FY 1991-92 and for FY 1992-93 there is a calculated deficit reduction built into the AOE based upon a formula, with a "cap" of 7.5% for any district's "effort adjusted" loss. Education Law, Section 3609, Subdivision 1.

Flat Grant: minimum amount of aid per pupil due any district in New York State is $360 per aidable pupil.

Full Value:(Actual Value or Market Value): the total assessed value of taxable real property divided by the equalization rate set by the State Baord of Equalization and Assessment for the assessment roll. The equalization rate is based upon market surveys and assessed values provided by local assessors. Using either a formula of 1.17 to the average of 1987 or 1988 full values or the average of 1988 and 1989 full values the state average for selected full value aid year 1991-92 is $203,000 compared to the state average for the 1990-91 aid year of $167,300.

General Support Expenditures: According to the Comptroller, this function includes expenditures for the board of education, district clerk, chief school administrator, tax collection, legal, central data processing and other support services. **Note** that the State Education Department counts the expenditure for chief school administrator, business office, purchasing,public relations, research and development, planning and evaluation as "Central Administration" and expenditures for the Board of Education and community services programs as "other" expenses.

High Tax Aid : New York as a three tier formula with different wealth eligibility requirements to compensate districts whose contribute too much in local taxes according to their tax rate. For tier one, a district must have a wealth adjusted tax rate greater than $24.00 per $1000 selected full valuation. For tier two a district must have an unadjusted tax rate greater than $25.50 per $1000 selected full valuation. For tier three a district must have a wealth adjusted tax rate greater than $43.00 per $1000 selected full value and have received tier two aid. Education Law, Section 3602, Subdivision 16

Instruction Expenditures: According to the Comptroller "Teaching" expenditures include salaries for teachers. aides, secretaries, teaching equiptment, tuition, textbooks and contractual expenditures for special schools.

Pupil Weightings: In calculating total pupil aid for expense and payment (TAPU), as:

•half day kindergarten	.50	
•full day kindergarten	1.00	
•full day kindergarten PSEN	1.25	(PSEN is restricted to Big 5 Cities)
• G7-12 PSEN	1.50	
•dual enrollment	1.00	
• all handicapped	1.00	

In calculating wealth units (TWPU)or establishing the resident average daily attendance(RWADA)the following handicapped weightings are used;

•handicapped (60% day in special class)	2.70
•remedial (20% week in resource room)	1.90
•speech (2 period a week)	1.13
•consultant teacher	1.80
•private school(sect 4405)	2.70
•summer	.12 (only TAPU)

Reorganization Incentive Aid: Districts which reorganized prior to July 1983 receive incentive aid for 14 years. For the first five years the aid equals 10% of the district's operating aid and for the following nine years the precent of aid decreases by 1% per year. Districts which reorganized after July 1983 receive incedntive aid equal to 20% for the first five years and 2% for the next nine years. In January 1992, the Governor proposed that the Reorganization Incentive percents for districts that reorganize after July 1992 be increased to 40% for five years and 4% for the remaining nine years. Education Law, Section 3602, Subdivision 14, paragraphs d , f

Rural: Although there are many conflicting definitions, the most agreed upon policy use seems to be less than 25 pupils in average daily membership divided by square miles for k-12 school districts, 150 persons or less per square mile for towns and village in "noncity" areas and counties where the largest place of residence is less than 10,000 and less than 20% of workforce commutes outside the county. The most contentious definition is the use of SMSA to define "nonmetropolitan" regions.

Tax rate per $1000 full valuation : the ratio of actual tax levy to full value of taxable property presented as a percent. Moving decimal point one place to the right creates the dollar to $1000 value. The district receives the full amount of a tax levy since the county(and most cities) are required to make up deficiencies. The levy amount could include a district's public library or community college.

k-12 District Cohorts: I988-89 Baseline Information

District By Size	$ Total Revenue Min	Mean	Max	% Property tax Min	Mean	Max	% State Aid Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**1125**	**4924**	**12266**	**.06**	**.39**	**.94**	**.05**	**.52**	**.96**
1100-2500	**6220**	**12215**	**33190**	**.07**	**.40**	**.85**	**.10**	**.51**	**.83**
20 Small City	**7880**	**15212**	**29900**	**.11**	**.32**	**.83**	**.11**	**.57**	**.81**
2500-4000	14750	25711	51020	.09	.50	.85	.11	.41	.78
4000-8000	25120	44600	84160	.21	.54	.84	.10	.37	.71
8000 +	50600	77650	129200	.24	.48	.69	.24	.43	.68
All Small City	7880	30476	83050	.11	.37	.83	.11	.53	.81
≤500	**1125**	**2732**	**4846**	**.09**	**.44**	**.94**	**.05**	**.48**	**.96**
1100-1500	**6220**	**8891**	**17230**	**.11**	**.35**	**.85**	**.10**	**.56**	**.81**
≤1100/ metro	**1125**	**8265**	**12266**	**.29**	**.70**	**.94**	**.05**	**.22**	**.61**
11-25/metro	**8040**	**17703**	**33190**	**.21**	**.62**	**.85**	**.10**	**.27**	**.65**

District By Size	Combined Wealth Ratio Min	Mean	Max	Full Value Enrl Pup Min	Mean	Max	Tax Rate per $1000 Min	Mean	Max
				(000)					
≤1100	**.2**	**.86**	**9.2**	**55**	**243**	**3419**	**0.5**	**15.08**	**28.17**
1100-2500	**.2**	**.88**	**5.1**	**39**	**215**	**2117**	**0.5**	**16.30**	**29.24**
20 Small City	**.3**	**.76**	**3.7**	**65**	**130**	**508**	**11.8**	**18.46**	**25.58**
2500-4000	.2	1.04	2.9	50	227	595	10.1	18.99	31.29
4000-8000	.4	1.06	3.5	80	250	828	14.0	19.75	30.13
8000 +	.4	.89	1.5	83	195	479	16.0	20.47	27.39
All Small City	.3	.87	3.7	65	164	920	6.6	17.96	27.41
≤500	**.2**	**1.08**	**9.2**				**0.6**	**14.03**	**24.78**
1100-1500	**.3**	**.79**	**5.1**	**62**	**199**	**1819**	**0.5**	**15.42**	**27.08**
≤1100 metro	**.4**	**2.46**	**9.2**	**127**	**737**	**3419**	**0.6**	**16.01**	**27.16**
11-25 metro	**.3**	**1.76**	**5.1**	**97**	**449**	**2117**	**0.5**	**17.7**	**29.24**

Baseline Information Continued

District By Size	% Nonpublic Min	Mean	Max	%Dropout Min	Mean	Max	CAADM/Sq. Miles Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**0**	**4.8**	**32.7**	**0**	**2.6**	**12.1**	**0.3**	**36.4**	**1055.2**
1100-2500	**0**	**7.5**	**31.5**	**0**	**2.9**	**12.2**	**2.8**	**103.4**	**1368.2**
20 Small City	**1.4**	**13.1**	**30.4**	**.6**	**4.8**	**7.3**	**24.1**	**256.1**	**796.6**
2500-4000	0.3	10.8	32.1	0	2.7	9.4	7.6	248.4	1229.1
4000-8000	1.1	12.0	39.1	.1	2.5	6.2	25.3	355.5	1520.3
8000 +	3.3	11.8	35.9	.3	2.7	6.6	114.7	416.8	1303.0
All Small City	1.2	13.7	33.2	.6	4.9	11.1	24.1	305.1	2129.3
≤500	0	3.8	29.6	0	2.1	12.1	0.3	10.3	315.3
1100-1500	0	5.7	26.9	0	3.1	12.2	3.1	72.7	735.1
≤1100 metro	0	12.5	32.7	0	1.4	4.3	1.6	196.7	1055.2
11-25 metro	1.2	13.6	31.5	0	1.5	4.7	15.3	306.9	1368.2

District By Size	$ Per Enrl Pup(88) Min	Mean	Max	Gen Supp•Tot Revenue Min	Mean	Max	Admin•Tot Revenue Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**4062**	**6028**	**20861**	**.02**	**.07**	**.14**	**E**	**.05**	**.11**
1100-2500	**4125**	**5853**	**12706**	**.03**	**.05**	**.10**	**.02**	**.07**	**.14**
20 Small City	**4712**	**5817**	**10917**	**.04**	**.05**	**.08**	**.05**	**.07**	**.10**
2500-4000	4349	6439	10046	.03	.05	.11	.05	.08	.13
4000-8000	4643	6729	11265	.03	.05	.07	.05	.08	.10
8000 +	4820	6243	8815	.03	.04	.06	.06	.07	.10
Small City	4217	5816	11147	.03	.05.	.08	.04	.08	.11
≤500	4062	6453	20861	.05	.09	.14	.01	.04	.09
1100-1500	4212	5491	10344	.03	.06	.08	.02	.06	.14
≤1100 metro	5804	10071	20496	.05	.07	.14	.01	.06	.11
11-25 metro	4533	7946	12706	.03	.06	.10	.02	.08	.14

Baseline Information Continued.

District By Size	Teach•Tot Revenue Min	Mean	Max	Transp•Tot Revenue Min	Mean	Max	Regent Graduates Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**.26**	**.56**	**.68**	**E**	**.06**	**.10**	**0**	**37.3**	**100**
1100-2500	**E**	**.57**	**.68**	**.02**	**.06**	**.10**	**0**	**40.3**	**67**
20 Small City	**.40**	**.56**	**.64**	**.01**	**.04**	**.06**	**0**	**36.4**	**54**
2500-4000	.45	.57	.64	.03	.06	.09	0	42.0	89
4000-8000	.05	.55	.63	.04	.05	.09	13	45.3	69
8000+	.53	.57	.60	.04	.06	.09	19	47.1	72
All Small City	.40	.58	.88	.01	.04	.08	0	39.2	65
≤500	.35	.55	.67	E	.06	.08	11	35.8	100
1100-1500	E	.57	.68	.02	.06	.09	0	41.8	69
≤1100 metro	.42	.55	.62	.01	.06	.10	0	40.8	100
11-25 metro	.44	.56	.63	.02	.05	.08	0	43.9	69

District By Size	Grade 6 Reading Min	Mean	Max	Grade 6 Math Min	Mean	Max	"College Bound"(90) Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**57**	**92.7**	**100**	**81**	**96.7**	**100**	**31**	**64.2**	**100**
1100-2500	**69**	**89.3**	**100**	**79**	**94.4**	**100**	**42**	**67.3**	**98.3**
20 Small City	**21**	**85.9**	**100**	**78**	**94.6**	**100**	**48**	**68.1**	**89**
2500-4000	73	90.3	98.0	72	94.3	100	45	76.1	98.4
4000-8000	75	90.7	98.0	84	95.0	100	36	78.1	96.4
8000+	81	92.2	96.0	84	96.1	99	58	78.2	94.0
All Small City	21	87.6	100	78	94.0	100	48	68.1	89.0
≤500	71	93.2	100	82	96.8	100	31	59.7	100
1100-1500	63	88.9	100	32	93.6	100	41	70.3	98.3
≤1100 metro	81	94.6	100	91	98.8	100	33	78.9	100
11-25 metro	68	91.1	100	32	95.5	100	62.6	82.2	98.3

Baseline Information Continued

District By Size	Regent Proposed % (December 89)			Governor Proposed% (January 90)			Final Budget % (May 1990)		
	Min	Mean	Max	Min	Mean	Max	Min	Mean	Max
≤1100	**-23.0**	**+9.9**	**+49.4**	**-33.5**	**+2.8**	**+42.8**	**-12.2**	**+6.0**	**+44.1**
1100-2500	**-10.3**	**+8.1**	**+29.3**	**-21.7**	**+2.1**	**+18.4**	**-5.6**	**+4.8**	**+24.1**
20 Small City	**-21.4**	**+8.3**	**+20.7**	**-22.1**	**+8.6**	**+10.2**	**-17.1**	**+3.6**	**+10.9**
2500-4000	-14.7	+7.8	+30.7	-23.9	+0.4	+24.9	-2.8	+4.3	+24.9
4000-8000	-3.7	+6.7	+26.6	30.4	-0.8	+13.0	-3.9	+3.3	+14.9
8000+	-6.9	+8.7	+23.4	-14.5	+2.7	+22.7	-4.7	+3.4	+9.3
All Small City	-21.4	+10.3	+21.4	-22.1	+2.5	+12.4	-17.1	+5.3	+15.0
≤500	-17.7	+11.6	+49.4	-23.8	+4.3	+42.8	-3.4	+7.5	+44.1
1100-1500	-19.9	+7.6	+38.3	-21.7	+4.6	+20.4	-6.6	+4.8	+28.8
≤1100 metro	-17.7	+4.2	+22.6	-23.1	-5.1	+26.7	-4.5	+5.9	+17.7
11-25metro	-19.9	+5.0	+38.3	-21.7	-3.7	+20.4	-4.9	+5.4	+27.3

District	11/90 Shortfall $		Teacher Turnover			11/90 Def•Tot Revenue			
	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min
≤1100	**-259**	**-65**	**0**	**32**	**11.3**	**0**	**-.07**	**-.02**	**-.01**
1100-2500	**-652**	**-177**	**-66**	**29**	**9.9**	**1**	**-.05**	**-.02**	**-.02**
20 Small City	**-404**	**-194**	**-92**	**17**	**7.8**	**3**	**-.02**	**-.01**	**-.01**
2500-4000	-1010	-395	-134	21	8.9	3	-.02	-.02	-.01
4000-8000	-1559	-685	-314	16	8.5	3	-.02	-.02	-.01
8000 +	-1411	-1076	-544	11	6.5	3	-.05	-.03	-.01
ll Small City	-1428	-444	-92	17	8.0	3	-.03	-.02	-.01
≤500	-88	-35	-16	32	12.4	0	-.02	-.01	-.01
1100-1500	-335	-121	-66	29	10.3	1	-.03	-.02	-.01
≤1100metro	-259	-141	-19	27	11.7	0	-.02	-.02	-4.7E
11-25 metro	-652	-301	-108	20	10.0	3	-.02	-.02	-.01

Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 4 X variables

Number	R	R-squared	Adj. R-squared	RMS Residual
4	.84	.7	.68	427.3

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
REGRESSION	4	2524545.24	631136.31	346.1
RESIDUAL	59	1075787.469	1823.86	Prob > .0001
TOTAL	63	3600332.709		

Residual Information Table

Obs.	Residual	e > 2.0	e > 3.0	Durbin-Watson test
1	1148.52	10	3	1.95

Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 4 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Probability
INTERCEPT	7230.42				
adm ratot rev89	7630.68	3148.83	.18	2.42	.0185
state aid tot rev	-4850.64	536.34	-1.51	9.04	.0001
State aid 89	1.7	.19	1.56	8.73	.0001
ren supp ratot r	-7426.85	3732.67	-.17	1.99	.0513

Residual Column 112

Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 4 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
INTERCEPT					
adm ratot rev89	1329.26	13932.1	2368.21	12893.15	5.87
state aid tot rev	-5923.96	-3777.31	-5747	-3954.27	81.79
State aid 89	1.31	2.09	1.37	2.02	76.15
ren supp ratot r	-14896.56	42.87	-13664.99	-1188.7	3.96

.500 total revenues to state aid dollars



Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 5 x variables

Multiple R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Standard Error	Observations
.9999	.99	.99	1104.49	1

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-stat
REGRESSION	5	4876155888.7	975231177.74	1.4E5
RESIDUAL	501	3.4E+9497E.89	6811.9871	0.0000
TOTAL	506	4.8378462E+9		

Residual Information Table

Residual	Std Err of Pred Val	Std Residual
47.484474.79	.127	.04

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values

Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 5 x variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Sig. level
INTERCEPT	361.021				
Intergovt rev	-.3756.47	5828.6	-.05	3.02	.0026
Own source rev89	2838.69	4319.54	.05	6.71	.0000
StarEnr 89	.13	.06	.11	2.33	.0178
Oth tax tot rev	-7651.84	635.31	-.49	12.04	.0000
State aid 89	1.4	.1	.78	14.5	.0000

Residual Columns 1-20

Multiple Regression Y = tot revenue 89 5 x variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
INTERCEPT					
Intergovt rev	-30249.78	-7263.16	-28788.21	-9124.73	10.36
Own source rev89	20463.43	37499.96	21847.17	76120.26	45.02
StarEnr 89	.02	.24	.04	.23	5.71
Oth tax tot rev	-8904.68	-6399	-8702.74	-6601.92	145.07
State aid 89	1.21	1.6	1.24	1.57	200.16

.1100 total revenues to state aid dollars



Multiple Regression y : 1989 tot revenue 4 x variables

Number	R	R-Squared	Adj. R-Squared	RMS Residual
1113	.95	.9	.9	4432.37

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
REGRESSION	4	5592723941.8	1398180985.47	7071.93
RESIDUAL	1107	219675210.74	198440.48	p = .000
TOTAL	1111	5812399151.6		

Residual Information Table

Row	Actual	Predicted	Residual
33	33,777.279	27	7

Note 4 cases deleted with missing values

Multiple Regression y : 1989 tot revenue 4 x variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err	Std. Coeff	t-value	Prob(t)
INTERCEPT	-1775.81				
%comp tax•tot	14528.86	1148.71	.54	12.65	.000
GWB 1190	1427.03	268.76	.22	5.31	.000
State Aid	1.67	.08	.63	21.6	.000
$ perEmp 88	1.33	.14	.47	9.67	.000

Residual Column 84

Multiple Regression y : 1989 tot revenue 4 x variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
INTERCEPT					
%comp tax•tot	12064.49	16793.23	12631.23	16426.5	160.08
GWB 1190	897.07	1957	982.9	1871.17	28.19
State Aid	1.51	1.82	1.54	1.79	466.7
$ perEmp 88	1.06	1.6	1.11	1.55	97.58

1100-2500 total revenues to state aid dollars



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Multiple Regression Y = total revenue 89 3 x variables

	R	R-Squared	Adj. R-Squared	RMS Residual
	.93	.87	.87	948.3

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
Regression	3	5263265878.97	1754421992.98	194.88
Residual	46	414037967.03	9000builds	0.000
Total	49	5677303375		

Residual Information Table

Durbin-Watson Statistic	1st Order Autocorrelation	D-W Test
1.988411 .07	.13	2.01

Multiple Regression Y = total revenue 89 3 x variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Prob. t
CONSTANT	5617.67				
state aid 1988 to	-2652.15	2468.81	-.78	10.62	.0001
87 CWR	978.76	488.1	.13	2.01	.0438
89 State aid	1.62	.07	1.17	23.35	.0001

Residual Column 94

Multiple Regression Y = total revenue 89 3 x variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
CONSTANT					
state aid 1988 to	-31449.21	-20980.79	-30539.68	-21904.32	12.75
87 CWR	-56.87	2017.59	126.5	1831	4.02
89 State aid	1.47	1.77	1.5	1.74	545.28

20 small city total revenues to state aid dollars



Simple Regression x = % Reg Dip 90 y = % coll bound 90

R	R-Squared	Adj. R-Squared	RMS Residual
.27	.08	.06	14.75

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
REGRESSN	1	1247.76	1247.76	5.74
RESIDUAL	61	13264.65	217.45	0.0[illegible]
TOTAL	62	14512.41		

Residual Information Table

Residual Sum of Squares	Durbin-Watson 1st Order	Durbin-Watson 2nd Order	D-W Test
13264.65	.29	.34	.53

Note: 1 case deleted with missing values

Simple Regression x = % Reg Dip 90 y = % coll bound 90

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Prob.
INTERCEPT	50				
% REG	.27	.11	.27	2.4	[illegible]

Confidence Intervals Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper
MEAN(y)	56.01	63.45	56.63	62.83
% REG	.04	.5	.09	.46

Residual Column 117

500 college bound to actual Regent Dip grads



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Multiple Regression of % coll bound 90 3 x variables

Multiple R	R-Squared	Adj R-Squared	RMS Residual
.[illegible]	.[illegible]	.[illegible]	[illegible]

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
Regression	3	3185.5[illegible]	[illegible]	6.06
Residual	[illegible]	75[illegible].37	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	78[illegible].87		

Residual Information Table

Durbin-Watson	Skewness	Kurtosis	D'Agostino test
Autoreg [illegible]	.15	.[illegible]	.83

Note: 4 cases deleted with missing values

Multiple Regression of % coll bound 90 3 x variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Probability
INTERCEPT	33.77				
[illegible]+90 96 Read	7.1[illegible]	1.3	.[illegible]	2.56	.01[illegible]
[illegible]+90 Dropout	-[illegible].7	.48	-.16	2.75	.0[illegible]
[illegible] Reg Dip 90	1.[illegible]4	.07	.[illegible]4	2.1	.[illegible]

Residual Column 105

Multiple Regression of % coll bound 90 3 x variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
INTERCEPT					
[illegible]+90 96 Read	.08	.6	.12	.55	6.53
[illegible]+90 Dropout	-2.38	-.19	-1.92	-.34	5.54
[illegible] Reg Dip 90	.01	.27	.07	.25	4.[illegible]9

1100 "college bound" to actual Regent Dip grads



Multiple Regression Y = collegebound 90 3 X variables

Number	R	R-Squared	Adj. R-Squared	RMS Residual
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
Regression	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Residual	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]		

Residual Information Table

Case Number	Actual	Predicted	Residual
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values

Multiple Regression Y = collegebound 90 3 X variables

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	t-value	Prob. > |t|
INTERCEPT	44.98				
High Read	.37	.06	.46	6.46	0.0000
Dropout	-2.63	.28	-.47	-9.36	0.0000
Reg Dip% 90	.31	.06	.39	5.01	0.0000

Residual Column 88

Multiple Regression Y = collegebound 90 3 X variables

Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper	Partial F
INTERCEPT					
High Read	.25	.49	.28	.46	41.8
Dropout	-3.17	-2.08	-3.05	-2.2	87.58
Reg Dip% 90	.08	.33	.11	.51	25.11

1100-2500 collegebound by 3 X Regent Dip grads



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Simple Regression X = dropout Y = 90 College bound

Count	R	R-Squared	Adj. R-Squared	RMS Residual
[illegible]	.42	.18	.1	3.77

Analysis of Variance Table

Source	DF	Sum Squares	Mean Square	F-test
[illegible]	1	136.69	136.69	7.86
[illegible]	18	1784.11	14.89	0.[illegible]
[illegible]	19	[illegible]		

Residual Information Table

Durbin-Watson	Autocorrelation	Dw test
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Simple Regression X = dropout Y = 90 College bound

Beta Coefficient Table

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Std. Coeff.	T-value	Probability
INTERCEPT	77.25				
SLOPE	-1.88	.36	-.42	-5.36	.0055

Confidence Intervals Table

Variable	95% Lower	95% Upper	90% Lower	90% Upper
MEAN(X,Y)	63.98	72.22	64.7	71.5
SLOPE	-3.9	-.7	-3.55	-.22

Residual Column 100

New York Districts Most in Need of Educational Reform
≤1100 Cohort

Grade 6 Reading
(lowest= 57)
Brushton-Moriah/Franklin
Remsen/Oneida
Hancock/Delaware
Worchester/Ostego
Downsville/Delaware
Angelica/Alleghany
Frewsburg/Chautagua
Herman-Dekalb/St. Lawrence
Dobbs Ferry/Westchester
Deposit/Broome
Bradford/Steuben
Sherman/Chautagua
Brocton/Chautagua
Cohocton/Steuben
Andes/Delaware
West Valley/Cattaragus
Westport/Essex
Lake Placid/Essex
South New Berlin/Chenango
Roxbury/Delaware

Grade 6 Mathematics
(lowest =81)
Remsen/Oneida
Cohocton/Steuben
Wyoming/Wyoming
Florida/Orange
Worchester/Ostego
West Valley/Cattaragus
Dalton-Nunda/Livingston
Rushford/Alleghany
Arkport/Steuben
Westport/Essex
Belfast/Alleghany
Livingston Manor/Sullivan
Hadley-Luzurne/Warren
Panama/Chautagua
Marathon/Cortland
Schroon Lake/Essex
Moriah/Essex
Limestone/Cattaragus
Edmeston/Ostego
Brushton-Moriah/Franklin

Secondary Dropouts
(highest= 12.1)
Johnsburg/Warren
New Lebanon/Columbia
Ostelic Valley/Chenango
Margaretville/Delaware
Campbell/Steuben
Ticonderoga/Essex
Livingston Manor/Sullivan
Salem/Washington
Newfield/Tompkins
Gilboa-Cones/Schoharie
Little Valley/Cattaragus
Brocton/Chautagua
Heuvelton/St. Lawrence
Hancock/Delaware
Ripley/Chautagua
Fort Ann/Washington
Stamford/Delaware
Afton/Chenango
Copenhagen/Lewis
Friendship/Alleghany

% Teacher Turnover
(most=32% annual)
Roscoe/Sullivan
Newfield/Tompkins
Westport/Essex
Fisher Island/Suffolk
Andes/Delaware
Florida/Orange
St. Johnsburg/Montgomery
Chester/Orange
Indian Lake/Hamilton
Belfast/Alleghany
Highland Falls/Orange
Tuxedo/Orange
Pleasantville/Westchester
Jeffersonville/Sullivan
Arkport/Steuben
Rye Neck/Westchester
Bolton/Warren
Eldred/Sullivan
Bridgehampton/Suffolk
Schroon Lake/Essex

% Seniors "college bound"
(lowest =31%)
Richmondville/Schoharie
Bridgehampton/Suffolk
Limestone/Cattaragus
Savona/Steuben
Florida/Orange
Oppenheim-Emp/Fulton
Lyme/Jefferson
Angelica/Alleghany
Franklinville/Cattaragus
Richburg/Alleghany
Crown Point/Essex
S. New Berlin/Chenango
Downsville/Delaware
Edmeston/Ostego
Andes/Delaware
VanHornesville/Herkimer
Rushford/Alleghany
Sherman/Chautagua
Sharon Spring/Schoharie
Lafargeville/Jefferson

% Regent Diplomas
(lowest =9 %, • =zero)
Oppenheim-Emp/Fulton
Willsboro/Essex
Rushford/Alleghany
S. New Berlin/Chenango
Richmondville/Schoharie
Franklin/Delaware
Chazy/Clinton
Margaretville/Delaware
Richburg/Alleghany
Crown Point/Essex
Clifton-fine/St. Lawrence
New York Mills/Oneida
St. Regis Falls/Franklin
Downsville/Delaware
Windham-Ashland/Greene
Cohocton/Steuben
Narrowsburg/Sullivan
Ostelic Valley/Chenango
S. Kortright/Delaware
Lyme/Jefferson
•Blindbrook/Westchester
•Irvington/Westchester
•Bronxville/Westchester

1100-2500 Cohort

Grade 6 Reading
(lowest 68)

Wyandach/Suffolk
Altmar Parish/Oswego
Herkimer/Herkimer
Cassadaga/Chautagua
Gowanda/Cattaragus
Berlin/Rensselaer
Hannibal/Oswego
Waterloo/Seneca
N. Rose-Wol/Wayne
Port Bryam/Cayuga
Galway/Saratoga
Jordan/Onondaga
Goshen/Orange
Gouvereur/St. Lawrence
Cornith/Saratoga
Trumanville/Tompkins
Bainbridge/Chenango
Malverne/Nassau
Sidney/Delaware
LeRoy/Genesse

Grade 6 Mathematics
(lowest72)

Wyandach/Suffolk
Hannibal/Oswego
Fonda/Montgomery
Bainbridge/Chenango
Stillwater/Saratoga
AltmarParish/Oswego
Southwestern/Chautagua
Penn Yan/Yates
Waterloo/Seneca
New Paltz/Ulster
Royalton/Niagara
Beekmanville/Clinton
Roundout/Ulster
Pembroke/Genesse
Jordan/Onondaga
Moravia/Cayuga
Kinderhook/Columbia
Goshen/Orange
Ellenville/Ulster
Broadalbum/Fulton

Secondary dropouts
(highest 12.2)

Cairo-Dur/Greene
Port Bryam/Cayuga
Berlin/Rensselaer
Lansingburgh/Rensselaer
Beekmanville/Clinton
Waterloo/Seneca
Cornith/Saratoga
Fallsburg/Sullivan
Union Springs/Cayuga
Wayland/Steuben
Hannibal/Oswego
N. Adirondack/Clinton
Copake-/Columbia
S. Cayuga/Cayuga
Moravia/Cayuga
Brunswick/Rensselaer
AltmarParish/Oswego
Pine Plains/Dutchess
Waverly/Tioga
Wellsville/Alleghany

Teacher Turnover
(most =29%*)

Dover/Dutchess
Bath/Steuben
Bainbridge/Chenango
Wyandach/Suffolk
E. Rockaway/Nassau
Berlin/Rensselaer
Mohawk/Herkimer
Cornith/Saratoga
Dryden/Tompkin
Pulaski/Oswego
Schoharie/Schoharie
Harpursville/Broome
New Paltz/Ulster
Liberty/Sullivan
Oyster Bay/Nassau
Cobleskill/Schoharie
Marcellus/Onondaga
Roslyn/Nassau
Royalton/Niagara
Ostego-Al/Ostego

Seniors "Collegebound"
(lowest=41%)

Roundout/Ulster
Addison/Steuben
N.Rose-Wol/Wayne
Beaver Valley/Lewis
Oxford/Chenango
Walton/Delaware
Berlin/Rensselaer
Granville/Washington
Perry/Wyoming
Cairo-Durham/Greene
Kinderhook/Columbia
Holley/Orleans
Oakfield/Genesse
Albion/Orleans
Pembroke/Genesse
Port Bryam/Cayuga
S. Lewis/Lewis
Coxsackie/Greene
Moravia/Cayuga
Watkins Glen/Schuyler

% Regent Diplomas
(lowest =6% •=zero)

Bryam Hill/Westchester
Wyandach/Suffolk
Ellenville/Ulster
Berlin/Rensselaer
Hoosick Valley/Rensselaer
Harpursville/Broome
Island Trees/ Nassau
Dover/Dutchess
Ausable/Clinton
Thousand Island/Jefferson
Pine Plains/Dutchess
Port Bryam/Cayuga
Lansingburgh/Rensselaer
Catskill/Greene
Cornith/Saratoga
Copake-/Columbia
E. Rockaway/Nassau
Sandy Creek/Oswego
Waterville/Oneida
Alden/Erie
•Edgemont/Westchester

no data=Mt. Sinai/Suffolk, Broadalbum/Fulton

Small City Cohort

Grade 6 Reading
(lowest=21)

Dunkirk/Chauatagua
Schenectady/Schenectady
Oleans/Cattaragus
Watervliet/Albany
Niagara Falls/Niagara
Troy/Rensselaer
Geneva/Ontario
White Plains/Westchester
Albany/Albany
Cohoes/Albany
Hudson/Columbia
New Rochelle/Westchester
Mechanicville/Saratoga
Lockport/Niagara
Johnstown/Fulton
Elmira/Chemung
Plattsburgh/Clinton
Newburgh/Orange
Glen Cove/ Nassau
Norwich/Chenango

Grade 6 Mathematics
(lowest=78)

Dunkirk/Chautagua
Schenectady/Schenectady
Geneva/Ontario
White Plains/Westchester
Oleans/Cattaragus
Poughkeepsie/Dutchess
Salamanca/Cattaragus
Long Beach/Nassau
New Rochelle/Westchester
Elmira/Chemung
Newburgh/Orange
Amsterdam/Montgomery
Glen Cove/Nassau
Johnstown/Fulton
Albany/Albany
Hudson/Columbia
Gloversville/Fulton
Lockport/Niagara
Mechanicville/Saratoga
Cohoes/Albany

Secondary Dropout
(highest=11.1)

Rome/Oneida
Jamestown/Chautagua
Middletown/Orange
Gloversville/Fulton
Albany/Albany
Little Falls/Herkimer
Oleans/Cattaragus
Norwich/Chenango
Schenectady/Schenectady
Johnstown/Fulton
Salamanca/Cattaragus
Newburgh/Orange
Elmira/Chemung
Cohoes/Albany
Dunkirk/Chautagua
Hudson/Columbia
Batavia/Genesse
Rensselaer/Rensselaer
Kingston/Ulster
Geneva/Ontario

Teacher Turnover
(highest =17)

Rensselaer/Rensselaer
Utica/Oneida
Ithaca/Tompkins
Sherill/Oneida`
Port Jervis/Orange
Schenectady/Schenectady
Middletown/Orange
White Plains/Westchester
Poughkeepsie/Dutchess
Oneida/Madison
Beacon/Dutchess
Rye/Westchester
New Rochelle/Westchester
Oneonta/Ostego
Amsterdam/Montgomery
Mt. Vernon/Westchester
Rome/Oneida
Hornell/Steuben
Johnstown/Fulton
Norwich/Chenango

Seniors "College bound"
(lowest =48%)

Port Jervis/Orange
Peekskill/Westchester
Niagara Falls/Niagara
Hornell/Steuben
Mt. Vernon/Westchester
Fulton/Oswego
N. Tonowanda/Niagara
Newburgh/Orange
Schenectady/Schenectady
Tonowanda/Erie
Dunkirk/Chautagua
Beacon/Dutchess
Hudson/Columbia
Cohoes/Albany
Elmira/Chemung
Watertown/Jefferson
Troy/Rensselaer
White Plains/Westchester
Albany/Albany
Johnstown/Fulton

% Regent Diplomas
(lowest =16 •=zero)

Poughkeepsie/Dutchess
Mt. Vernon/Westchester
Schenectady/Schenectady
Peekskill/Westchester
Rensselaer/Rensselaer
Hudson/Columbia
Watertown/Jefferson
Watervliet/Albany
Rome/Oneida
Little Falls/Herkimer
Albany/Albany
White Plains/Westchester
Salamanca/Cattaragus
Plattsburgh/Clinton
Troy/Rensselaer
Long Beach/Nassau
Lackawana/Erie
Niagara Falls/Niagara
Beacon/Dutchess
Fulton/Oswego
• Rye/Westchester

Chart 4

Worst/Best Off Districts Under 2500 When Facing State Shortfalls

≤1100 Cohort

Worst Off Districts	tax rate per $1000	% state aid	CWR	Dist. Full value per enrled pupil	90 $ per CAADM
Richburg/Alleghany	12.48	85	.2	67000	5269
Brookfield/Madison	13.41	73	.3	73000	5739
Limestone/Cattaragus	14.82	74	.3	79000	5874
Savona/Steuben	12.95	82	.2	55000	5764
Bradford/Steuben	11.82	76	.3	60000	5420
Scio/Alleghany	10.89	91	.2	66000	4869
Whiteville/Alleghany	13.62	73	.3	85000	5166
Greenwood/Steuben	13.32	96	.4	134000	5856
Jasper-Troup/Steuben•	0.86	80	.3	73000	5268
Friendship/Alleghany	15.18	76	.2	60000	5448
Best Off Districts					
Tuckahoe/Westchester	23.07	14	1.9	393000	9088
Blind Brook/Westchester	18.58	15	2.4	521000	10951
Southold/Suffolk•	0.95	12	2.3	881000	9489
Rye Neck/Westchester	21.26	15	1.4	369000	9245
Sag Harbor/Suffolk•	0.71	11	3.8	1548000	9587
Croton Harmon/Westches	26.28	17	1.9	342000	10663
Dobbs Ferry/West.	27.16	14	1.9	302000	9130
Briarcliff/Westchester	24.34	15	2.6	368000	10414
Irvington/Westchester	18.78	12	2.6	509000	11104
Bronxville/Westchester	17.55	9	3.7	639000	12212
Anomalies • [tax rate under 1.00 per $1000]					
Shelter Island/Suffolk	0.63	8	4.8	1829000	12113
Bridgehampton/Suffolk	0.73	9	6.3	3010000	20693
Fisher Island/Suffolk	0.60	4	9.2	3419000	21675
Bolton/Warren	0.84	15	2.1	921000	8605
Barker/Niagara	0.54	13	2.0	258000	7113
Schroon Lake/Essex	0.94	21	1.8	554000	6181

Bellville/Jefferson	0.95	63	.6	192000	5763
Romulus/Seneca	0.82	64	.5	116000	5471
West Canada Valley/Herk	0.98	75	.3	74000	4817

1100-2500 Cohort

Worst Off Districts	tax rate per $1000	% state aid	CWR	Dist Full Value per pupil	90 $ per CAADM
Sherburne-Earl/Chenango	17.38	71	.4	77000	5750
Bainbridge/Chenango	20.64	60	.4	96000	5518
N. Adirondack/Clinton	18.15	69	.4	83000	5453
Chenango Forks/Broome	19.32	65	.5	78000	5278
Lansingburgh/Rensselaer	22.33	56	.5	95000	5455
Mt. Sinai/Suffolk	22.66	57	.6	163000	6540
Holland/Oneida	20.20	64	.4	94000	5498
Canton/St. Lawrence	19.74	66	.4	84000	5258

Chart 4

Northeastern/Clinton	21.43	61	.5	101000	5851
Brunswick/Rensselaer	23.90	55	•	111000	6012
Wyandach/Suffolk	23.07	58	.3	129000	8193
Best Off Districts					
Southhampton/Suffolk	0.53	10	1.3	1819000	10803
East Hampton/Suffolk	5.12	9	5.1	1471000	10093
Shorham-Wading/Suffolk	6.89	10	4.9	2117000	14769
Westhampton/Suffolk	7.03	10	4.2	759000	8969
Harrison/Westchester	11.09	12	4.1	925000	11074
Hampton Bays/Suffolk	11.26	13	1.9	714000	8496
Mattituck-Cutch/Suffolk	12.25	12	1.7	590000	8015
Locust Valley/Nassau	13.36	12	2.7	761000	10715
North Shore/Nassau	12.90	13	2.4	874000	12312
Jerico/Nassau	14.57	11	3.4	869000	12098
Anomalies [under 11.00 per $1000]					
Dolgeville/Herkimer	7.82	63	.4	97000	5380
Hannibal/Oswego	8.57	83	.3	60000	4945
Gowanda/Cattaragus	8.82	64	.5	94000	5345
Mohawk/Herkimer	10.15	80	.3	108000	5295
Waverly/tioga	10.50	73	.4	79000	4691
Adirondack/Oneida	10.67	70	.4	106000	4449
Holland/Erie	10.80	63	.5	112000	4655
Sandy Creek/Oswego	10.93	73	.4	104000	5182

Small Cities Under 2500

Worst Off Districts	**tax rate per $1000**	**% state aid**	**CWR**	**Dist. Full Value per pupil**	**90 $ per CAADM**
Lackawana/Erie	18.62	63	.5	98000	6903
Cohoes/Albany	19.99	59	.6	92000	5300
Rensselaer/Rensselaer	22.68	61	.6	106000	6482
Norwich/Chenango	23.54	60	.5	92000	5566
Peekskill/Westchester	25.58	62	.8	138000	10527
Best Off Districts					
Rye/Westchester	18.75	11	3.7	508000	10541
Geneva/Ontario	14.91	33	.7	153000	4867
Dunkirk/Chautagua	15.70	44	.5	89000	5985
Oneonta/Ostego	17.68	44	.8	161000	5497
Anomalies					
Salamanca/Cattaragus	10.28	72	.3	68000	5180
Hornell/Steuben	11.83	76	.3	65000	5490

Chart 5

Districts on Contingency Budget 1991-92

From State Education Department Survey, September 1991

≤500	500-1100	1100-1500	1500-2500
•Green Island/Albany	Alfred-Almond/Alleghany	Berne Knox/Albany	Beekmanville/Clinton
•West Valley/	•Pine Valley/Chautagua	Voorheesville/Albany	Dansville/Livingston
•Eliz-town/Essex	*McGraw/Cortland	•Port Bryam/Cayuga	Canastoga/Madison
Schroon Lake/Essex	Millbrook/Dutchess	Cassadaga Val/Chautagua	Malverne/Nassau
Westport/Essex	*Brushton-Mor/Franklin	Northeastern/Clinton	Wilson/Niagara
Webb/Herkimer	West Canada Val/Herkimer	Cleveland Hill/Erie	Holland/Erie
Bradford/Steuben	Alexandria/Jefferson	Mayfield/Fulton	•Gorham/Ontario
Wyoming/Wyoming	Harrisville/Lewis	•Canajoharie/Montgomery	Hannibal/Oswego
	•Florida/Orange	Pulaski/Oswego	•* Bayport/Suffolk
	* Heuvelton/St. Lawrence	Hoosick Valley/Rensselaer	Marlboro/Ulster
	Duanesburg/Schenect	Norwood/St. Lawrence	Newark Valley/Tioga
	Hartford/Washington	Schuylerville/Saratoga	Sodus/Wayne
	Salem/Washington	Wayland/Steuben	Attica/Wyoming
	Dobbs Ferry/Westchest	•Fallsburgh/Sullivan	Letchworth/Wyoming
		Cambridge/Washington	
		Perry/Wyoming	

• = on contingency budget 1990-91
* = cut either breakfast or lunch programs in 1991-92

On Normal Budget 91-92 But Voters Did Not Pass on First Time

≤500	500-1100	1100-1500	1500-2500
Limestone/Cattaragus	Afton/Chenango	Watervliet/Albany	Scio/Alleghany
Charlotte Val/Delaware	*Hancock/Delaware	Cairo-Durh/Greene	Wellsville/Alleghany
*Minerva/Essex	North Collins/Erie	Mohawk/Herkimer	Saranac Lake/Franklin
St. Regis Falls/Franklin	Alexander/Genesse	*E. Rockaway/Nassau	Coxsackie/Greene
Richmdville/Schoharie	Ticonderoga/Essex	Waterville/Oneida	W. Hempstead/Nassau
Cohocton/Steuben	Clifton-fine/St. Law	Lafayette/Onondaga	Shorham-Wad/Suffolk
Johnsburg/Warren	Edward Knox/St. Law	Manchester/Ontario	Liberty/Sullivan
*Mt. Pleasant/Westch.	Hammondsport/Steuben	Williamson/Wayne	

Small Cities Under 2500

Dunkirk/Chautagua	Ogdenburg/ St. Lawrence
Jamestown/Chautagua	Mechanicville/Saratoga
Norwich/Chenango	Peekskill/Westchester
Hudson/Columbia	Rye/Westchester
Cortland/Cortland	
Lackawana/Erie	
Johnstown/Fulton	
Little Falls/Herkimer	
Sherrill/Oneida	
Geneva/Ontario	
Oneonta/Ostego	

Chart 5

Districts That Did Not Participate in SED Survey

≤500

Belmont/Alleghany
Andover/Alleghany
Angelica/Alleghany
Richburg/Alleghany
Little Valley/Cattarag
Andes/Delaware
Franklin/Delaware
Long Lake/Hamilton
Wells/Hamilton
VanHornesville/Herk.
Lyme/Jefferson
Lauren/Ostego
Worchester/Ostego
Morris/Ostego
Wyanskill/Rensselaer
Sharon Sps./Schoharie
Gilboa-Cones/Schoharie
Arkport/ Steuben
Roscoe/Sullivan
Bolton/Warren

21/65 (32%)

500-1100

Cuba/Alleghany
Filmore/Alleghany
Hinsdale/Cattaragus
Frewsburg/Chautagua
Mayfield/Chautagua
Sherman/Chautagua
Chazy/Clinton
Germantown/Columbia
Cincinnatus/Cortland
Marathon/Cortland
Margaretville/Delaw.
Stamford/Delaware
Northeast/Dutchess
Pawling/Dutchess
Moriah/Essex
Bellville/Jefferson
Copenhagen/Lewis
Genesseo/Livingston
Dalton-Nun/Livingston
York/Livingston
Mt. Morris/Livingston
DeRuyter/Madison
Stockbridge/Madison
Wheatland/Monroe
Ft. Plain/Montgomery
Fabius-Pom/Onondaga
Onondaga/Onondaga
Naples/Ontario
Honeoye/Ontario
Greenwood/Orange
Haldane/Putnam
Madrid/St. Lawrence
Lisbon/St. Lawrence
Middleburgh/Schoharie
Prattsburg/Steuben
Jasper-Troup/Steuben
Sag Harbor/Suffolk
Eastport/Suffolk
E. Moriches/Suffolk
Delaware Val/Sullivan
Eldred/Sullivan
Candor/Tioga
Hadley-Luzurne/Warren
Lake George/Warren
Argyle/Washington
Bronxville/Westchester
Briarcliff/Westchester
Tuckahoe/Westchester
Rye Neck/Westchester

49/145 (33%)

1100-1500

Alleghany/Cattaragus
Cato-Med/ Cayuga
Union Spring/Cayuga
Morovia/Cayuga
Falconer/Chautagua
Silver Creek/Chautagua
Oxford/Chenango
Delhi/Delaware
Dover/Dutchess
Pine Plains/Dutchess
Rhinebeck/Dutchess
Cheek-Sloan/Erie
Frankfort/Herkimer
Herkimer/Herkimer
E. Rockaway/Nassau
Oyster Bay/Nassau
Westmoreland/Oneida
Sandy Creek/Oswego
Otego-Und/Ostego
Brunswick/Rensselaer
Cornith/Saratoga
Watkin Glen/Schuyler
Hampton Bay/ Suffolk
Spencer/Tioga
Granville/Washington
Edgemont/Washington

Small City Under 2500

Plattsburgh/Clinton
Oneida/Madison
Rensselaer/Rensselaer
Hornell/Steuben

4/20 (20%)

26/94 (27%)

1500-2500

Chenango Val/Broome
Whitney Point/Broome
Ausable/Clinton
Chatham/Columbia
Kinderhook/Columbia
Red Hook/Dutchess
Alden/Erie
Cheek-Maryvale/Erie
East Aurora/Erie
Saranac Lake/Franklin
Livonia/Livingston
N. Bellmore/Nassau
Franklin Square/Nassau
Island Trees/Nassau
Manhasset/Nassau
Roslyn/Nassau
North Shore/Nassau
Bethpage/Nassau
Newfane/Niagara
Starpoint/Niagara
Royalton/Niagara
Adirondack/Oneida
Clinton/Oneida
Marcellus/Onondaga
Westhill/Onondaga
Jordan/Onondaga
Solvay/Onondaga
Skaneateles/Onondaga
Cornwall/Orange
Albion/Orleans
Medina/Orleans
Altmar Parish/Oswego
S. Orange/Rockland
Canton/St. Lawrence
Gouvernor/St. Lawren.
Cobleskill/Schoharie
Bath/Steuben
Port Jefferson/Suffolk
Wyandach/Suffolk
Newark Valley/Tioga
New Paltz/Ulster
Onteora/Ulster
N. Rose-Wol/Wayne
Greenburgh/Westchester
Mt. Pleasant/Westchest.
Eastchester/Westchester
UF Tarrytown/Westch.
Somers/Westchester
Penn Yan/Yates

49/118 (41%)